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The economic governance of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) was substantially 
reformed in recent years with the introduction of 
the European Semester, the adoption of the Six-
pack and Two-pack, and the signature of the 
Treaty on Stability, Governance and 
Coordination (which includes the Fiscal 
Compact). This revamped framework was 
primarily intended to promote greater fiscal 
discipline, as well as a more proactive adoption of 
structural reforms to prevent and correct 
economic imbalances in the eurozone, via a set of 
recommendations - the so-called Country 
Specific Recommendations (CSRs). 
Belgium is among the countries that have 
complied the least with these recommendations. 
In the period 2011–2012, during the first two 
cycles of the European Semester, Belgium only 
fully implemented 7% of the CSRs issued by the 
Council (European Parliament, 2014a). As many 
as 63% of the recommendations were not 
implemented in the sense that no relevant policy 
actions with substantial effects were taken. A 
more nuanced, synthetic indicator built by 
Deroose and Griese (2014) places Belgium in the 
higher range of the countries that have made 
‘limited progress’ (i.e., some measures were 
announced, but these measures appear 
After four rounds of the European Semester 
process of EU economic coordination, 
Belgium has done relatively little to comply 
with EU recommendations. This brief 
substantiates and confirms this claim after 
clarifying the meaning of these 
recommendations. While the challenges 
underlined by the European Commission 
still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the 
recommendations for reforms has been low. 
Not only do coordination processes remain 
bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of 
the recommendations’ concerns – external 
competitiveness, social security reforms, 
market reforms – are not traditionally 
defended by the political left in Belgium. 
The controversy surrounding the 
recommendations for national structural 
reforms owes much to their supply-side 
orientation, which contrasts with the 
inability of the EU to pursue demand-side 
policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the 
recommendations highlight relevant issues 
that ought to be addressed, and indicate 
where scope for national debate exists.  
 
    
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
2 
 
insufficient and/or their 
adoption/implementation is at risk). This still 
compares somewhat negatively with the EU 
average, which is in the lower range of ‘some 
progress’ (some promising measures announced 
or adopted, but implementation not yet 
completed or guaranteed). 
These appreciations lead us to reflect in more 
detail about the way Belgium has actually 
responded to the recommendations. Firstly, I will 
provide a synthetic reading of EU economic 
governance. While it can be skipped over, this 
part will provide a brief on the rationale for, legal 
basis of and main actors in EU economic 
governance. This will provide the reader with a 
concise view of the meaning of these 
recommendations, which are presented in one 
Council Decision but relate to different 
procedures and legal bases. I will highlight the 
difference between the budgetary 
recommendation and the recommendations 
relevant to broader economic objectives.  
Secondly, I will explore in more detail the CSRs 
addressed to Belgium and summarize how 
Belgium answered them. In this way, the gap 
between the recommendations and the actual 
implementation over the period 2011–2013 will 
be revealed.  
We will then have the opportunity, in a third step, 
to underline the challenges that Belgian 
authorities face in the years to come, in light of 
some key lessons that can be drawn from the 
2011–2014 rounds of the European Semester. 
1. A SYNTHETIC READING OF THE 
EUROPEAN SEMESTER  
With the introduction of the European Semester 
cycle, the EU aimed to integrate and streamline 
different procedures into a single coherent 
coordination process. The main output at the end 
of the European Semester thus consists, for each 
Member State, of one single Council 
recommendation containing several CSRs. 
However, each CSR may relate to one or several 
specific EU policy objectives and underlying legal 
procedures. 
Two pillars and three procedures 
Despite some overlap, we can broadly distinguish 
between the two main policy pillars to which 
CSRs may belong: a fiscal policy pillar and an 
economic policy pillar. Table 1 synthetizes the 
coordination mechanisms that make up these two 
pillars (see next page). 
The fiscal pillar is grounded in the coordination 
mechanism of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), as amended by the Six-pack and Two-
pack. The fiscal policy CSR under the SGP is 
issued for each Member State and typically is the 
first of the CSRs. It can trigger further procedural 
steps under the preventive arm or the corrective 
arm of the SGP, which can ultimately lead to the 
imposition of sanctions on the (eurozone) 
Member States. 
The ‘economic pillar’ concerns all other 
economic policies for which some form of 
coordination exists at EU level. The CSRs issued 
within this pillar relate to two coordination 
mechanisms. The first coordination mechanism 
relates to the procedure foreseen in the Europe 
2020 strategy, introduced in 2010, which follows 
on from the Lisbon Strategy. The second is the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
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Table 1: The policy pillars under which CSRs are issued 
 Fiscal coordination pillar Economic coordination pillar 
(main) 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP) 
Europe 2020 strategy 
Core 
objective 
Sustainability of fiscal policies Sustainability of economic 
policies 
Prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
Smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth 
Main Treaty 
basis 
Art. 121 TFEU (multilateral 
surveillance – preventive arm) 
Art. 126 TFEU (excessive 
deficit procedure – corrective 
arm) 
Art. 136 (Euro Area:  
coordination and surveillance of 
their budgetary discipline)  
Art. 121 (6) TFEU 
(multilateral surveillance) 
Art. 121 (2) TFEU (broad 
economic guidelines) 
Art. 148 (employment 
guidelines)  
Art. 136 (Euro Area 
economic guidelines) 
Secondary 
legislation 
EC 1466/97 and subsequent 
revisions (preventive arm) 
EC 1467/97 and subsequent 
revisions (corrective arm) 
EC 1173/2011 (enforcement 
measures for euro area) 
+ Two-pack: EC 472/2013 and 
EC 473/2013 (a.o. monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary 
plans euro area) 
EC 1176/2011 on the 
prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
– 
EC 1174/2011 enforcement 
measures for euro area 
(MIP) 
 
Relevant 
Council 
decision 
(preceding 
the CSR) 
  Europe 2020 integrated 
guidelines (latest for 2010–
2014):  
Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (2010/410/EC) 
and Employment Guidelines 
(2010/707/EU) 
  Annual Growth Survey 
(2014 Council Conclusions, including Joint Employment 
Report) 
Sanction Potential sanctions (in both 
preventive and corrective arms) 
Potential sanctions in 
corrective arm, i.e., for 
countries presenting 
‘excessive’ imbalances 
No sanction mechanism 
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Europe 2020 Strategy’s overall objective is ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth.’ It is the most 
overarching mechanism and consequently 
concerns all the CSRs. This coordination is 
grounded in Article 121 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of Europe (TFEU), which stipulates 
that ‘Member States shall regard their economic 
policies as a matter of common concern and shall 
coordinate them within the Council,’ and in 
Article 148 of the TFEU, which stipulates that 
‘Member States and the Union shall . . . work 
towards developing a coordinated strategy for 
employment.’ In this respect and according to 
these treaty dispositions, the EU Council adopts, 
under recommendation of the Commission, 
broad economic guidelines and employment 
guidelines. These guidelines are in practice 
adopted for a period of three years – the most 
recent cover the period 2010–2014 – and are 
integrated to form what is now called the 
‘integrated EU 2020 guidelines’ (Council, 2010).  
The current integrated guidelines thus consist of 
six broad economic guidelines and four 
employment guidelines. These ten guidelines, 
adopted by the Council under the 2010 Belgian 
presidency, form the main policy guidance for the 
period discussed in this paper. They lay the 
foundations for the economic policy pillar CSRs. 
The overall direction they provide is shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The Integrated Europe 2020 
Guidelines 
Broad Economic Guidelines 
Guideline 1 Ensuring the quality and 
sustainability of public finances  
Guideline 2 Addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances  
Guideline 3 Reducing imbalances in the euro 
area 
Guideline 4 Optimizing support for R&D and 
innovation, strengthening the 
knowledge triangle and unleashing 
the potential of the digital economy 
Guideline 5 Improving resource efficiency and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
Guideline 6 Improving the business and 
consumer environment and 
modernizing the industrial base 
Employment Guidelines 
Guideline 7 Increasing labour market 
participation and reducing 
structural unemployment 
Guideline 8 Developing a skilled workforce 
responding to labour market needs, 
promoting job quality and lifelong 
learning 
Guideline 9 Improving the performance of 
education and training systems at 
all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary education 
Guideline 10 Promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty 
 
Under the Europe 2020 strategy, CSRs are issued 
under a non-binding soft-law governance. The 
mechanisms embedded in the 2020 strategy do 
not represent a paradigm shift in comparison 
with the Lisbon Agenda and the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) (Vilpišauskas, 2012). 
OMC processes set common EU goals while 
allowing Member States to develop their own 
policies to meet these targets. Non-compliance 
with the recommendations cannot lead to 
sanctions. Rather, effectiveness should result 
from mechanisms such as naming and shaming, 
diffusion through discourse, deliberation 
between actors, learning, sharing best practices 
and networking (Trubek and Trubek, 2007). 
A second coordination mechanism, the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) 
was introduced by the Six-pack in 2011. Besides 
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being linked to a stated objective under the 
Europe 2020 Strategy and the aforementioned 
guidelines, some CSRs may thus more specifically 
refer to policies relevant to the correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. The 
recommendations issued under the MIP, while 
still being associated with the Europe 2020 
Strategy, may carry an extra weight: the threat of 
sanctions. If the Commission estimates that a 
Member State faces ‘excessive’ economic 
imbalances, it may request the initiation of 
procedures under the corrective arm of MIP. 
And in last resort, these procedural steps may 
consist of the imposition of financial sanctions 
on a eurozone Member State failing to comply 
with the recommendations. 
Coordination process and main actors 
The European Semester integrates these three 
coordination processes into a yearly cycle of 
coordination (strictly speaking: a European 
Semester and a National Semester). I will here 
succinctly discuss the main actors in the process 
(the Commission and the Member States) and the 
main output of the procedures (the CSRs and the 
reports of Member States). 
At EU level, the Commission proposes CSRs to 
the Council, which adopts them. The Council 
barely modifies the CSRs recommended by the 
Commission, whose influence is thus central. The 
Council – that is, EU Member States as a whole 
– in principle politically ‘endorses’ the CSRs 
drafted by the Commission. But in practice this 
endorsement cannot be equated with a 
commitment by each Member State to act in 
accordance. Instead, the council adoption of 
CSRs tends to signify to the Commission that it 
has taken due notice of/approves its 
recommendation. The result of this relative 
sidelining of the Council is that a supposedly 
‘multilateral’ coordination process tends to drift 
towards a ‘bilateral’ coordination process, with 
the Commission on one side and each individual 
Member State on the other. 
In turn, at national level, Member States have to 
‘reply’ to the CSR by producing a National 
Stability Programme (NSP) and a National 
Reform Plan (NRP). The former can be 
considered as the Member State’s response to the 
fiscal CSR (in the fiscal pillar) and the latter as the 
response to the recommendations for structural 
reforms (economic pillar). 
The relationship between the Commission and 
Member States, however, differs in each of the 
two pillars. In the fiscal policy pillar, the 
Commission has been assigned the role of the 
watchdog and referee of fiscal discipline. It 
monitors the budgetary situation of Member 
States and must ensure fiscal discipline by making 
sure Member Sates comply with the SGP rules. 
In this respect, the Commission has been granted 
important powers by the Member States: its 
recommendations are more than 
recommendations strictu sensu – they are closer to 
injunctions. Their weight comes from the relative 
strictness of the rules, as well as the threat of 
sanctions. 
In the larger economic fields of the second pillar, 
the CSRs do not carry such weight – owing to the 
legal bases we have briefly shown. Bertoncini 
(2013) usefully synthetized the relationships 
between the EU and its Member States in the 
coordination of economic and social policies by 
labelling them as a ‘hyper OECD regime’ in 
which ‘the EU can recommend structural 
reforms, not command.’ The EU would indeed 
resemble the OECD – in so far as relations are 
based on the joint analysis of the main economic 
and social challenges that countries are facing, 
and on the definition of common goals. These 
relations are likewise based on a combination of 
political incentives (recommendations, control 
and peer pressure) between members. But 
recommendations do not have any binding effect 
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on the domestic political choices of Member 
States. They only carry more weight than the 
OECD’s recommendations because EU relations 
are more procedural and involve more political 
pressure. In other words, recommendations in 
the economic (and social) fields are 
recommendations, strictu sensu. 
2. HOW BELGIUM ADDRESSED THE EU 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Here we briefly discuss both the content of the 
recommendations and the response provided by 
the Belgian authorities. The 2014 CSRs are 
provided in Annex I. For a complete wording of 
all CSRs issued between 2011 and 2014, a useful 
study by the European Parliament Services 
presents their evolution for each key area of 
reform (European Parliament, 2014b). 
A. Fiscal consolidation 
On the fiscal side, Belgium was placed in the 
corrective arm of the SGP by the end of 2009, 
when its nominal deficit reached 5.9% of GDP. 
The deficit had to be brought back under the 3% 
of GDP ceiling by 2012, and Belgium was 
expected to pursue a yearly correction of its 
structural deficit by at least 0.75% of GDP. This 
proved to be particularly challenging, because 
following the June 2010 federal elections, the new 
government only took office in December 2011, 
after 541 days of negotiations over the sixth 
reform of the Belgian state. During this period, 
the care-taking government had no mandate to 
undertake significant reforms. As a result, 
Belgium was set to significantly miss the deadline, 
with a deficit forecast at -4.6% of GDP for 2012. 
Belated efforts that proved insufficient in a 
zero growth context 
However, once a federal government was in 
office by the end of 2011, fiscal consolidation 
measures were taken in several stages in 2012 
(General Budget and following corrections) to 
address the budgetary slippage. The approach to 
fiscal consolidation came to be known as the 
‘cheese rasp’ (‘râpe à fromage’/‘Kaasschaaf’): a 
multiplication of small budgetary measures to 
reduce spending and increase tax revenues. This 
technique implied that no major structural 
reforms would be undertaken. Instead, many 
measures were considered as ‘one shots’, which 
would allow Belgium to reduce its nominal 
deficit, but to reduce only to a lesser extent its 
structural deficit.  
This minimalist approach runs against the 
philosophy of the (revised) SGP rules, in which 
the correction of the structural deficit has 
become the central – future-oriented – measure 
of the fiscal effort. Meeting the structural criteria 
allows in turn for more flexibility in correcting the 
nominal deficit. The reasons for this counter-
intuitive approach can be traced back to the 
governmental programme. The resolution of 
institutional issues – a legitimate concern in the 
ever-evolving Belgian Federation – was 
prioritized over addressing socio-economic ones. 
The main objective of the government coalition 
was thus to negotiate the sixth reform of the 
state, not to find a consensus on major socio-
economic reforms. Moreover, the coalition was 
broad – bringing together six political parties that 
did not necessarily share the same socio-
economic views on potential reforms. 
The cumulative total impact of budgetary 
measures (excluding one-off measures) was 
estimated at 2.0% of GDP over 2010–2012, with 
most of the fiscal effort concentrated in 2012 
(1.5% of GDP), as the government started 
implementing measures (Commission, 2013a) 
(see Annex II for an overview of the main 
budgetary measures during the period 2010–
2013). The largest revenue-increasing impact 
came from the lowering – in several stages − of 
the reference rate for the notional interest 
deduction in corporate taxation (allowance for 
    
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
7 
 
corporate equity), accounting for 0.4% of GDP. 
Other measures with more sizeable impacts 
included the increase in the financial income tax 
in 2012 (0.2% of GDP), contributions by 
financial institutions (0.2% of GDP) and several 
increases of taxes on products (0.3% of GDP).  
On the expenditure side, the net impact of 
measures was close to zero (Commission, 2013a). 
The main deficit-reducing measures consisted in 
reducing the wage bill and functioning costs of 
public administration (0.4% of GDP), in curbing 
the rising trend in health expenditure (0.2% of 
GDP) and in reforms in social security (0.1% of 
GDP). These measures were broadly offset by 
expenditure-increasing measures such as welfare 
adaptations of social benefits (0.3% of GDP), the 
expansion of wage subsidy schemes (0.4% of 
GDP), and an increasing recourse to clean car 
subsidies (up to 2011). 
This, however, proved insufficient to reach the 
3% target in 2012. Not only was growth reduced 
to nil, but the government intervention to rescue 
Dexia (0.8% of GDP) resulted in a deficit of -
3.9% of GDP (subsequently revised to -4.1% of 
GDP). Moreover, the annual fiscal effort over the 
2010–2012 period, calculated as the evolution of 
the structural balance, was estimated at 0.3% of 
GDP – significantly below the 0.75% of GDP 
recommended. As a result, in May 2013, the 
Council, acting upon recommendation by the 
Commission, decided that Belgium had not taken 
significant action to correct its excessive deficit. 
The Council required Belgium to correct the 
deficit to -2.7% of GDP by 2013, with a structural 
consolidation of 1% of GDP. Belgium, however, 
did not face the threat of immediate sanction, nor 
of potential ones, as it was obvious that the 
country would manage to reach 3% ceiling the 
following year. 
And indeed, helped by efforts pursued in 2013 in 
three budgetary controls (in March, July and 
September), Belgium managed to bring down its 
deficit to -2.8% of GDP, which allowed the 
Council to decide to end the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure in 2014. 
Successive budgetary path revisions 
In the meantime, Belgium modified several times 
its medium-term objective (MTO) – the main 
fiscal target under the preventive arm of the SGP, 
expressed in structural terms. A first explicit 
mention can be traced back to the 2011 Stability 
Programme, which mentions a structural budget 
balance target of 0.2% of GDP in 2015. In its 
2013 Stability Programme, Belgium revised this 
objective and committed itself instead to reaching 
a balanced budget in structural terms by 2015, 
before reaching its MTO of a surplus of 0.75% of 
GDP in structural terms in 2016. In 2014, 
Belgium’s fiscal council (High Council of 
Finance) recommended that the MTO be pushed 
back to 2017. The government presented this 
adjustment path in a draft 2014 Stability 
Programme, deferring confirmation of this MTO 
to the next, fully mandated, government. The 
new government does not intend to confirm the 
MTO. The draft budget transmitted to the 
Commission in October 2014 indicates Belgium’s 
intention of postponing from 2016 to 2018. It is 
therefore likely that the MTO will be set in 2019. 
B. Structural reforms 
The recommendations for structural reforms 
drafted by the Commission have evolved over 
time, but have repeatedly concerned the same key 
areas: the long-term sustainability of finances, the 
(cost) competitiveness of the economy, the 
labour market(s), the tax system, 
product/services/network industries markets 
and greenhouse gas emissions targets. In this 
section, we will refer to the wording and structure 
provided in the latest CSRs (2014). For the 
recommendations’ evolution, the EGOV study 
(2014a) provides a useful overview. The summary 
is based on the analysis of action undertaken that 
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was provided in Commission Staff Working 
Documents (Commission, 2013b; Commission 
2014) assessing the implementation of the 2012 
CSRs and 2013 CSRs by the Belgian authorities.  
According to the Commission’s definition, 
‘limited progress’ means that ‘The Member State 
has announced some measures to address the 
CSR, but these measures appear insufficient 
and/or their adoption/implementation is at risk,’ 
and ‘some progress’ means that ‘the Member 
State has announced or adopted measures to 
address the CSR. These measures are promising, 
but not all of them have been implemented yet 
and implementation is not certain in all cases.’ 
Long-term sustainability of finance owing to 
population ageing (some progress) 
This recommendation envisages the reforms that 
are the most crucial to ensuring the medium- and 
long-term sustainability of public finances in the 
context of an ageing population: the pension 
system and the health-care system. Budgetary 
cost for social security for the elderly is bound to 
increase substantially if no policy changes are 
made (between 2010 and 2020, 5.1 percentage 
points (pp) of GDP in public pension spending, 
compared with an average of 1.4pp in the EU, 
and 2.7pp of GDP in long-term care spending, 
compared with 1.4pp in the EU as a whole ). The 
underlying issue for Belgium is thus to adapt its 
social security system to prevent unsustainable 
debt developments. 
In pension reforms, the Commission particularly 
concentrated on the low level of employment for 
older workers (aged 55–64), which stood at 
41.7% in 2013, while the EU average is above 
50%. It therefore suggests that Belgium (i) steps 
up efforts to reduce the gap between the effective 
and statutory retirement age, (ii) brings forward 
the reduction of early-exit possibilities, (iii) 
promotes active ageing, and (iv) aligns the official 
retirement age to changes in life expectancy. How 
Belgium ought to address the growing cost of its 
health-care system is not specified. It is instead 
put in generic terms of ‘improving the cost-
effectiveness of public spending on long-term 
care.’ By focusing on the employment rate, the 
Commission’s recommendation is also a 
reminder of Belgium’s commitment under the 
2020 Strategy to reach its target of employment 
for 73.2% of the population aged 20–64 by 2020. 
Overall, the Commission judged that Belgium 
had made some progress with reforming its social 
security system for the elderly, but that much 
more would be needed given the magnitude of 
the challenge. Belgium did make limited progress 
(along the lines of suggestions i, ii and iii) in 
taking measures conducive to increasing the 
share of seniors working, by aligning the pension 
bonus with the new early retirement age, ensuring 
fair treatment of mixed careers and strengthening 
the reactivation incentives of the survivor’s 
pension. Rules on earnings after retirement have 
been relaxed, and dismissals through pre-
retirement schemes have been made more 
expensive. In addition, a pension report (The F. 
Vandenbroucke Report) was ordered and the 
sixth reform of the state transferred some 
responsibilities in long-term care to the federated 
entities. But whether this will lead to significant 
reforms is a political decision left to the future. 
 (Cost) competitiveness and wage setting 
(limited progress) 
The CSR on the wage-setting mechanism is 
certainly the one that attracted the most political, 
media and public attention. The political 
sensitivity of the topic and arguments with 
Belgian stakeholders led the Commission to 
gradually bring nuance to its recommendation. 
The CSR has thus evolved over the years from 
being overly prescriptive – with the 2012 CSR 
stating how the wage-setting mechanism ought to 
be reformed – to a now much broader 
recommendation on competitiveness. Its core 
element remains ‘reform [of] the wage-setting 
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system, including wage indexation,’ but nuances 
and complementary routes for restoring 
competitiveness were added. 
First, facing the criticism that cost 
competitiveness is not limited to wage 
developments, the Commission incorporated 
additional ways to restore cost competitiveness 
into the 2014 CSR: (i) strengthening competition 
in the retail sectors; (ii) removing excessive 
restrictions in services, including professional 
services; and (iii) addressing the risk of further 
increases in energy distribution costs. These 
recommendations for increasing competition via 
product and services market reforms previously 
constituted a CSR in themselves. Limiting price 
increases via the competition channel may 
additionally prevent further inflation via the 
automatic indexation mechanism. 
Moreover, the 2014 CSR adds more general 
elements of competitiveness that are not strictly 
related to ‘cost’ competitiveness, but 
competitiveness in general: (iv) promoting 
innovation through streamlined incentive 
schemes and reduced administrative barriers; and 
(v) pursuing coordinated education and training 
policies addressing the pervasive skills 
mismatches and regional disparities in early 
school leaving. 
What came to be known as the ‘wage indexation 
CSR’ was issued under the MIP framework. The 
rationale of the CSR is intrinsically linked to the 
functioning of the EMU and the need to prevent 
unsustainable macroeconomic development. 
With limited fiscal space and no national 
monetary policy, flexibility in wage development 
is essential in the eventuality of an economic 
shock – and its absence may ultimately prove 
socially costly – as amply illustrated by the 
internal devaluation in several eurozone countries 
following the crisis. Therefore Belgium ought to 
be in line with the productivity and wage 
developments of its main trading partners. This 
was the raison d’être of the 1996 competitiveness 
law , which established a preventive wage norm 
based on the expected evolution of the labour 
costs in three reference countries – namely 
France, Germany and the Netherlands (basically 
setting a ceiling on the possible wage increases 
above the automatic indexation). Because there 
was a sizable wage slippage, the Commission 
merely underlined the need to ensure the law 
remained effective. The Commission thus does 
not suggest suppressing the automatic indexation 
altogether, but reforming it. The national political 
debate is about how to best compensate for 
inflation, while allowing for the flexibility 
necessary for the Belgian economy to adjust to 
potential shocks. 
Overall, the Commission services estimate that 
Belgium made limited progress, because the 
Belgian federal government did not progress in 
reforming the wage setting system and the 1996 
law on competitiveness. But it nonetheless took 
limited measures to curb rising wage costs. In 
consultation with the social partners, the 
government decided that the gap of wage costs 
accumulated since 1996 in comparison with 
neighbouring countries would be corrected over 
a period of six years. The wage norm for 2013–
2014 has been set at 0%, so that real wages will 
not increase beyond automatic indexation and 
scale increases. The health index calculation 
formula was also revised in order to increase 
downward pressure on measured inflation, and 
thereby to contribute to wage moderation.  
Shifting taxes from labour (limited progress) 
Shifting taxes away from labour towards more 
growth friendly bases (on consumption, 
environmental and property bases), as well as 
simplifying the tax system and increasing its 
efficiency, are recurrent recommendations made 
by the Commission to many Member States. And 
Belgium is a particularly good case in point. Not 
only is the implicit tax rate on labour one of the 
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highest in the EU, at 42.8% in 2012, but the 
Belgian tax system also combines relatively high 
nominal tax rates with a generally complex system 
including many tax expenditures. The 
Commission was particularly keen on this reform 
because consumption taxes made up only 23.7% 
of total tax revenue, the lowest percentage in the 
EU, and because revenue from energy taxation is 
the second lowest in the EU. 
Limited progress was made in the taxation field. 
In general, rather than shift taxes, the federal 
government has implemented successive rounds 
of labour cost reductions, the majority of which 
are targeted at specific groups, types of 
companies or sectors. The Commission judged 
that no progress had been made to increase VAT 
efficiency, except for the abolition of the VAT 
exemption for lawyers’ services. On 
environmental taxation, the Commission severely 
criticized the reduction from 21% to 6% of the 
VAT rate for electricity, saying that it went 
against the objectives of both simplifying the tax 
system and moving towards a less growth-
distorting tax base. 
Overall, the Commission services concluded that 
‘rather than reforming its relatively growth-
distorting tax system, Belgium has made only 
piecemeal changes, adding to the complexity of 
the system.’ 
Labour market (some progress) 
To complement the taxation shift away from 
labour, the Commission has essentially focused 
on the need to increase the participation rate in 
the labour market. It therefore suggests a focus 
on: ‘(i) reducing financial disincentives to work, 
(ii) increasing labour market access for 
disadvantaged groups such as the young and 
people with a migrant background, (iii) 
improving professional and inter-regional 
mobility and (iv) addressing skills shortages and 
mismatches as well as early school leaving.’ 
Belgium registered some progress regarding the 
reduction of disincentives to work (i), by 
reforming the unemployment benefit system to 
accelerate the gradual decrease of the 
unemployment allowance, while the work bonus 
for senior workers was increased. Moreover, a 
cooperation agreement between the regions and 
the federal government provides for enhanced 
activation, conditionality, quicker follow-up and 
sanctions. The Commission services, however, 
point out that unemployment traps in Belgium 
remain both sizeable and pervasive. 
The Commission services also regret that the 
Belgian federated entities have not developed a 
coherent strategy to address the issues affecting 
second- and third-generation migrants (ii). They 
also point to the lack of coherence between 
education and employment policies, given the 
specific needs of the migrant population – 
especially in the French-speaking community.  
Regional employment services have continued to 
invest in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in 
order to promote inter-regional mobility (iii), but 
the Commission services note that there is room 
for more ambitious target setting and financial 
investment. 
Finally, labour market, education and public 
training institutions in the three 
regions/communities have intensified 
cooperation to make initial vocational training 
more relevant to market needs and to cope with 
the increasing need for continuous vocational 
training as well as adult training (iv). The 
Commission services, however, point out that a 
more fundamental reflection on the fit between 
the educational system and the labour market is 
required, as well as on the effective results of 
adult training in terms of skills acquired. They 
also deplore the complexity and potential dead-
weight losses caused by the interaction between 
the traineeship support schemes developed at the 
federal level and those developed by the regions. 
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Greenhouse gas emissions (Limited 
progress) 
The recommendation enjoined Belgium to meet 
its target to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
in the non-Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
sectors by 15% between 2005 and 2020. The 
Commission also repeatedly asked Belgium to 
ensure a clear division of tasks between the 
regions in achieving this objective. 
Progress in meeting this recommendation has 
been limited. The three regions have adopted 
plans (Décret Climat for Wallonia, Brussels’ Code 
of Air, Climate and Energy legislation 
(COBRACE) and the Flemish Climate Policy 
Plan 2013–2020 for Flanders), but full 
implementation with concrete measures has not 
yet been achieved. A clear division of efforts 
remains elusive. 
 
LESSONS SO FAR AND CHALLENGES  
As we saw, Belgium did relatively little to comply 
with the recommendations. There is an essential 
and obvious first explanation: the rather long 
negotiations (541 days) over the formation of a 
government following the May 2010 elections 
prevented Belgium from enacting ambitious 
structural reforms. Its care-taking federal 
government only managed to act on the fiscal 
front to comply with short-term fiscal targets, 
while lacking the political mandate to introduce 
ambitious structural reforms.  
Key challenges lie ahead both in terms of fiscal 
consolidation and structural reforms. I will 
highlight these challenges, reflecting on the 
lessons that can be drawn after several rounds of 
the European Semester process. 
A. Fiscal consolidation 
As we have seen, Belgium’s essential achievement 
on the budgetary front was to reduce its deficit 
below the 3% ceiling and exit the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure in 2014. Belgium will now need 
to abide by the rules set out in the preventive arm 
of the SGP. This means correcting its structural 
deficit by at least 0.5% of GDP per year (the 2014 
CSR advised Belgium to correct it by 0.75% of 
GDP). The challenge will be twofold.  
A shift towards structural fiscal consolidation 
First, structural corrections need to be favoured 
over mere nominal ones. This will require a shift 
in approach, because thus far, the focus has 
essentially been set on reaching nominal fiscal 
targets. This also means that the emphasis should 
shift from short-term considerations to longer-
term ones. Budgetary reforms will need to 
become more structural, i.e., intended to have a 
lasting impact.  
One welcome development is the greater reliance 
placed on structural targets by Belgian 
institutions dealing with budgetary matters, such 
as the High Council of Finance and the Federal 
Planning Bureau. Nevertheless, while the 
reference to the structural deficit for budgetary 
rules and budgetary planning is sensible, the 
figure remains difficult to estimate. A recent 
disagreement that took place between the Federal 
Planning Bureau and the Commission on the 
estimation of the output gap (which is central in 
measuring the structural deficit) illustrates this 
point (Lebrun, 2014). Such a discrepancy in the 
most central fiscal target of the SGP may lead to 
various issues. In the first place, budgetary 
planning may differ, as the High Council of 
Finance chose in 2014 to rely on Belgian figures 
rather than on figures produced by the 
Commission in order to advise the Belgian 
authorities on the establishment of its National 
Stability Programme. Secondly, discrepancies 
may ultimately lead to difference in the evaluation 
of the fiscal effort made by the Belgian 
authorities, and hence also of their compliance 
with the SGP. 
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Reaching a consensus in the Belgian 
Federation 
The second challenge is quite obviously the size 
of the necessary adjustment required before 
Belgium can reach its MTO. This will represent a 
major political challenge in the years to come. 
Both the growth context and the political stance 
within the Belgian Federation will determine 
whether fiscal targets will be reached, and 
compliance with the SGP rules ensured. 
This challenge is exacerbated by the complex 
institutional framework in the Belgian 
Federation. As the EU authorities have 
repeatedly stressed in their fiscal 
recommendation (CSR 1, see Annex I), Belgium 
still lacks a binding instrument with an explicit 
breakdown of fiscal targets for all its entities 
(federal, regional/community level).  
The federal level and the regions adopted a 
cooperation agreement in December 2013 in 
order to strengthen Belgium’s fiscal coordination 
framework (Belgium, 2013). In this framework, 
the High Council of Finance (HCF), the Belgian 
fiscal council, has been granted a greater role in 
the budgetary process. The HCF advises the 
Belgian authorities on a fiscal path that complies 
with the SGP and the ensuing EU fiscal 
recommendations. It therefore proposes a 
breakdown of objectives in structural and 
nominal terms for each entity of the federation.  
However, the different entities must find a yearly 
consensus regarding both the global (Belgian) 
budgetary path (particularly by fixing the MTO), 
and the exact breakdown of fiscal targets between 
themselves (Article 4 of the cooperation 
agreement). Formally, this consensual decision is 
taken by the Concertation Committee, the 
highest political body bringing together ministers 
from the different entities of the Belgian 
Federation. Following the decision by the 
Concertation Committee, the HCF monitors 
compliance of this multilevel commitment. 
Crucially, if a consensus on meeting the EU 
requirements cannot be found, this may result in 
the overall fiscal position of Belgium not 
complying with the SGP rules. The Belgian fiscal 
path is the sum of the budgetary plans of its 
entities, which are constitutionally placed on 
equal footing in the federation – the regions are 
not sub-federal entities, but equal-to-federal-level 
entities.  
Arguably, following the 24 May elections and the 
formations of the federal and 
regional/community governments, the 
asymmetry between a right-wing coalition at the 
federal level and left-wing coalitions in the 
Brussels Region, the Walloon Region and the 
French Community government makes more 
likely the scenario in which no budgetary 
consensus can be found.  
Recent developments, however, suggest that all 
entities may jointly agree to delay the MTO to 
2019, i.e., two years later than the HCF suggested. 
If so, Belgium will be close to infringing the 
preventive arm of the SGP, which would require 
Belgium to argue that significant reforms would 
be undertaken over the period. 
B. Structural reforms 
As for other countries, the Belgian reply to the 
EU recommendations on structural reforms is 
little more than a bureaucratic exercise. The NRP 
is a compilation of measures taken and of the 
authorities’ good intentions. The focus is set on 
the past, rather than on the future. Crucially, the 
NRP does not equate to a commitment to 
reform. Overall, the ‘ownership’ of the 
recommendations that is repeatedly sought by 
EU institutions has been weak in Belgium. As we 
discussed earlier, weak Belgian ownership is 
largely due to the dominance of institutional 
issues over economic ones in the political debates 
of recent years. But political positions within the 
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ruling coalitions may explain why the country was 
not keen to reform.  
A left vs right divide 
First, the reception of the EU’s 
recommendations varied among political parties 
in Belgium, depending on their position on the 
political spectrum. On the left, parties tended to 
reject the content of the recommendations. The 
Commission was generally depicted as a liberal-
conservative body which lacked legitimacy. 
Several events illustrate this political stance. On 
one occasion, Paul Magnette of the French-
speaking Parti Socialiste (PS), then a minister in 
the federal government, asked: ‘But who is Olli 
Rhen?’1 With this highly publicized question, he 
intended to denounce the Commission as an 
‘ultra-liberal bastion’ that lacked democratic 
legitimacy. Belgian socialist Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) from the PS and 
the Socialistische Partij Anders (sp.a) were the 
only Belgian MEPs – and the only MEPs from 
the EU Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats group – to have voted against both 
the Six-pack and the Two-pack in the European 
Parliament. The PS and sp.a proposed that a 
‘socialist Six-pack’ would become an alternative 
to the ‘liberal Six-pack’. Elio Di Rupo, then prime 
minister of the ruling federal coalition, also 
claimed that employment would not be created 
‘with the Six-pack, the Two-pack, or the anti-
social reforms imposed to Member States.’2  
On the other hand, the right has used the EU 
recommendations as an argument for authority. 
This was made clear in the Informateur note of 25 
June 20143 that would form the ruling agreement 
basis for assembling a centre-right coalition for 
the federal government. The 2014 CSRs were 
listed as a starting point and summary of the 
reforms that the future government would have 
to undertake. Further developing this line of 
thinking, the new centre-right government, 
which brought together Liberals (Mouvement 
Réformateur and Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten), Flemish Christian-Democrats 
(Christen Democratisch en Vlaams) and Flemish 
Nationalists (Nieuw Vlaamse Alliante), reached a 
governmental agreement that intends to 
significantly address several of the EU 
recommendations. 
The nature of the EU policy recommendations 
offers one possible explanation for the split they 
have created between left and right on the 
political spectrum. Several key recommendations 
are linked to supply-side reforms that are in 
essence liberal – in particular on labour market 
reforms (CSR4) and product and services market 
reforms (CSR 5). Concern for external 
competitiveness (CSR 5) is also traditionally 
shared by right-wing political parties. On the 
other hand, traditional themes of the left, such as 
preserving internal consumption, do not figure in 
the CSRs. Moreover, the Commission CSR on 
the wage indexation system systematically sides 
with the arguments of employer organizations 
rather than with worker organizations. In doing 
so, the Commission inevitably (further) 
destabilizes the inner-workings of the Belgian 
‘social model’, as the CSRs are preoccupied with 
the capacity of the market economy to deliver 
prosperity, and not with equity considerations. 
Structural reforms – necessary but 
insufficient?  
Part of the dissatisfaction of the left can also be 
linked to the policies that the EMU governance 
cannot produce: a macroeconomic policy mix that 
would also include demand-side policies and 
more unorthodox use of monetary policy. The 
constraints are inherent to the institutional 
architecture of the EMU. Demand-side policies 
contradict the SGP to the extent that its built-in 
flexibility may not be sufficient in a prolonged 
crisis. Besides, the use of ‘unorthodox’ monetary 
policy is constrained by Treaty provisions. And a 
fundamentally different policy mix would require 
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instruments of economic coordination that are 
simply not available in the current institutional 
setup of the EMU. In the absence of elements of 
fiscal federalism in the EMU – a larger 
EU/eurozone budget (fiscal capacity) and a 
federal debt (eurobonds), any economic 
adjustment process must necessarily and 
exclusively rest at national level.  
In the current institutional setup, structural 
reforms are advocated precisely because – 
according to standard economic theory – in the 
absence of a possible adjustment in exchange 
rates (because of the irreversibility of the euro 
and the common monetary policy), and in the 
absence of fiscal space (due to SGP rules, and 
more fundamentally because of the high public 
indebtedness level), any adjustment process must 
necessarily be a market-based one. Supply-side 
reforms aim not only to raise potential GDP, but 
to allow for flexible market-based adjustment. 
Labour market and product and services market 
reforms have a preventive, forward-looking role 
– they must prevent macroeconomic imbalances 
from building up and increase potential growth. 
And they also have a corrective role – they allow 
for the smooth adjustment of the economy to any 
shock. For several ‘peripheral’ eurozone 
countries, it was made abundantly clear that 
labour, product and services markets were too 
inefficient and rigid to allow for a smooth 
adjustment after a shock. If one is to adhere fully 
to this rationale, which underscores the 
recommendations issued under the MIP, there is 
no alternative to structural reforms. The one 
sided-approach of the recommended economic 
policies has thus logically alienated part of 
Belgian opinion. The result is a decreasing sense 
of ownership of the recommended reforms. 
One could not reproach EU institutions for 
failing to advocate for some fiscal sovereignty to 
be transferred to the EU/EMU/eurozone level. 
The Commission’s Blueprint for a deep and 
genuine EMU (Blueprint), as well as Herman van 
Rompuy’s Roadmap towards a genuine EMU 
promoted the idea of a ‘fiscal union’. Notable 
suggestions included backing contractual 
arrangements between the EU authorities and 
Member States with financial support, a shock 
absorption mechanism supported by a fiscal 
capacity at the EMU level, etc. But these elements 
were opposed by many Member States, and 
therefore set aside by the European Council. 
Lacking these specific instruments, the EU has 
no other option than to advocate to undertake 
structural reforms at national level. These 
reforms are clearly necessary but – and this is where 
the debate concentrates – not necessarily sufficient.  
Moreover, the sense of a lack of control, and the 
resulting limited national ownership is only 
further reinforced by the overall technocratic 
dimension of EU economic governance. The 
coordination process is indeed dominated by 
bodies that are essentially executive: the 
Commission and the Council, and more precisely 
their financial arm, the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs and the 
ECOFIN Council. And despite the fact that the 
European Parliament was a co-legislator on the 
main regulations that reformed the economic 
governance (the Six-pack and Two-pack), its role 
in the European Semester is limited to an 
‘economic dialogue’ that does not involve any 
decision-making powers. The technocratic 
flavour of the whole process certainly adds to the 
feeling that the EU recommendations are both 
illegitimate and biased. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first summarized how the 
processes of EU economic governance led to the 
issuance of CSRs addressed to each Member 
State by the EU. We stressed in particular that 
budgetary recommendations are of a different 
nature to the recommendations for structural 
reforms. The former carry more weight than the 
latter, which are non-binding recommendations. 
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We then reviewed the measures that Belgium 
undertook in the fields in which the EU 
recommended action: fiscal policy, long-term 
sustainability of finances, (cost) competitiveness 
of the economy, labour market(s), tax system, 
product/services/network industries markets 
and greenhouse gas emissions targets. 
On the budgetary side, Belgium’s main 
achievement was to bring its fiscal deficit below 
3% by 2014 and exit the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. But challenges still lie ahead. To abide 
by the SGP’s preventive arm, a minimal 
correction of 0.5% of GDP of the structural 
balance will be necessary. The country will 
therefore need to start focusing more on the 
long-term horizon that structural corrections 
imply. The size of the effort will nonetheless 
probably push Belgian authorities to further delay 
the MTO to 2019, which will border on an 
infringement of the rules of the preventive arm 
of the SGP. An additional issue results from the 
complexity of the Belgian Federation. The overall 
fiscal path of Belgium rests on a consensus that 
must necessarily be found between all at the 
governing level – as the federated entities are 
constitutionally on a par with the federal level. 
When no consensus is found between its entities, 
Belgium can be at risk of deviating from its 
budgetary path, and possibly of infringing EU 
budgetary rules. 
Regarding other economic policy 
recommendations, Belgium made relatively 
limited progress in enacting structural reforms. 
An important cause of this inaction was the long 
negotiation process that led to the sixth 
institutional reform of the state. It not only took 
541 days, but also resulted in the coming into play 
of a government that was not set up to focus on 
much else. Nevertheless, the Belgian case 
illustrates several known insights concerning the 
workings of EU economic governance. The first 
is that the CSRs do not necessarily result in 
reforms being enacted at national level. And 
when measures are enacted, the causal link 
between the recommendations and the reforms 
undertaken can seem rather tenuous. The 
European Semester still resembles a bureaucratic 
exercise with little capacity to induce structural 
reforms at national level. If a country undertakes 
structural reform, this mostly stems from the 
willingness and capacity of that country to do so, 
rather than from any (non-binding) EU 
recommendation. 
This lack of ownership of the recommendations 
also largely results from the varying response of 
national policymakers across the national political 
spectrum. On the right, EU recommendations 
were welcomed and used as an argument of 
authority. However, on the left, reception was 
generally negative. As argued in this paper, 
opposition to the CSR content can be traced back 
to the classical themes defended by the left: 
labour rather than capital, internal consumption 
rather than external competitiveness, and 
demand-side policies rather than supply-side 
policies. In this context, the lack of supra-national 
competences for demand-side policies – via the 
deepening of the EMU – crucially leaves the left 
with very limited policy instruments at national 
level. Moreover, the technocratic way in which 
the recommendations are produced at EU level, 
and the sense of a lack of political alternatives 
does not favour participation in a constructive 
national debate. 
Nevertheless, the EU recommendations still 
leave ample room for national-level political 
debate. How can the social security system be 
adapted to the ageing population? How can the 
labour market participation be increased – 
especially for the young, the elderly and people 
with a migrant background? How can the wage 
indexation system be maintained without 
undermining Belgian competitiveness? How 
should an overtly complex tax system be adapted 
without weighting too heavily on labour? What is 
the best way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
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Rather than prescribing solutions, the 
Commission mostly stresses the need to answer 
these questions. It is the sole responsibility of 
Belgian policymakers to debate these questions 
and come up with solutions to issues that will 
continue to dominate the national political 
agenda in the years to come. 
Xavier Vanden Bosch is Research Fellow at 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations. 
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ANNEX I : THE 2014 COUNTRY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BELGIUM 
CSR 1 Following the correction of the excessive deficit, reinforce the budgetary measures for 
2014 in the light of the emerging gap of 0.5% of GDP based on the Commission services 
2014 spring forecast, pointing to a risk of significant deviation relative to the preventive 
arm of the SGP requirements. In 2015, significantly strengthen the budgetary strategy to 
ensure the required adjustment of 0.6% of GDP towards the medium-term objective, 
which would also ensure compliance with the debt rule. Thereafter, until the medium-
term objective is achieved, pursue the planned annual structural adjustment towards the 
medium-term objective, in line with the requirement of an annual structural adjustment 
of at least 0.5% of GDP, and more in good economic conditions or if needed to ensure 
that the debt rule is met in order to put the high general government debt ratio on a 
sustained downward path. Ensure a balanced contribution by all levels of government to 
the fulfilment of fiscal rules including the structural budget balance rule, through a 
binding instrument with an explicit breakdown of targets within a medium-term planning 
perspective. 
CSR 2 Improve the balance and fairness of the overall tax system and prepare a comprehensive 
tax reform that will allow shifting taxes away from labour towards more growth friendly 
bases, simplifying the tax system, closing loopholes, increasing VAT efficiency, 
broadening tax bases, reducing tax expenditures and phasing out environmentally 
harmful subsidies. 
CSR 3 Contain future public expenditure growth relating to ageing, in particular from pensions 
and long-term care, by stepping up efforts to reduce the gap between the effective and 
statutory retirement age, bringing forward the reduction of early-exit possibilities, 
promoting active ageing, aligning the statutory retirement age and career length 
requirements to changes in life expectancy, and improving the cost-effectiveness of 
public spending on long-term care.  
CSR 4 (also issued under the MIP framework) Increase labour market participation, notably by 
reducing financial disincentives to work, increasing labour market access for 
disadvantaged groups such as the young and people with a migrant background, 
improving professional mobility and addressing skills shortages and mismatches as well 
as early school leaving. Across the country, strengthen partnerships of public authorities, 
public employment services and education institutions to provide early and tailor-made 
support to the young. 
CSR 5 (also issued under the MIP) Restore competitiveness by continuing the reform of the 
wage-setting system, including wage indexation, in consultation with the social partners 
and in accordance with national practice, to ensure that wage evolutions reflect 
productivity developments at sectorial and/or company levels as well as economic 
circumstances and to provide for effective automatic corrections when needed; by 
strengthening competition in the retail sectors, removing excessive restrictions in 
services, including professional services and addressing the risk of further increases of 
energy distribution costs; by promoting innovation through streamlined incentive 
schemes and reduced administrative barriers; and by pursuing coordinated education and 
training policies addressing the pervasive skills mismatches and regional disparities in 
early school leaving. 
  
CSR 6 Ensure that the 2020 targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from non-ETS 
activities are met, in particular as regards buildings and transport. Make sure that the 
contribution of transport is aligned with the objective of reducing road congestion. Agree 
on a clear distribution of efforts and burdens between the federal and regional entities. 
Source: (Council, 2014) 
 
ANNEX II: MAIN BUDGETARY MEASURES (2010–2014) 
Revenue Expenditure 
2010 
 Increase in excise duties on diesel: 0.1% of 
GDP  
 Levy on the nuclear rent: 0.1% of GDP  
 Increase in Corporate Income Tax 
(Modification of the reference rate for 
notional interest deduction and other 
changes in deductions): 0.1% of GDP  
 Abolishment of the Personal Income Tax 
reduction in the Flemish Region (0.1% of 
GDP)  
 Reduced VAT rate on restaurant bills: -0.1% 
of GDP  
 
 Savings on staff expenditure and 
functioning costs: -0.1% of GDP  
 Welfare adaptations of social benefits: 
+0.1% of GDP  
 Expansion of wage subsidy schemes: +0.2% 
of GDP  
 
2011 
 Lifting of bank secrecy, regularization and 
court settlements: 0.1% of GDP  
 Increase in the fee for the deposit 
protection fund: 0.1% of GDP  
 
 Reduction in primary expenditure (other 
than social benefits): -0.15% of GDP  
 Reduction in health-care expenditure: -0.1% 
of GDP  
 Welfare adaptations of social benefits: 
+0.1% of GDP  
 Expansion of wage subsidy schemes: +0.1% 
of GDP  
2012 
 Reform of the system of notional interest 
deductibility: 0.3% of GDP  
 Increase in the taxation of dividends and 
interests: 0.2% of GDP  
 Increase in the levy on nuclear rent: 0.1% of 
GDP  
 Measures against tax fraud: 0.1% of GDP  
 Expenditure savings in health care: -0.1% of 
GDP  
 Suppression of the subsidy for clean cars:  
-0.1% of GDP  
 Reduction in administrative expenditure:  
-0.1% of GDP  
 Expenditure saving measures in social 
security (e.g., reform of the unemployment 
benefit system): -0.1% of GDP  
  
 Welfare adaptations of social benefits: 
+0.1% of GDP 
2013 
 Increase in the financial income withholding 
tax: 0.1% of GDP 
 Change in the reference rate of the notional 
interest deduction in corporate income 
taxation: 0.1% of GDP 
 Increase in several indirect taxes (0.1% of 
GDP): excise duties on tobacco and alcohol, 
tax on premiums of life insurance contracts  
 Fiscal amnesty and anti-fraud measures: 
0.2% of GDP 
 Sale of telecom licences and emission 
permits: 0.1% of GDP 
 Reduction in social security contributions:  
-0.1% of GDP 
 Reduction in central government 
expenditure (-0.2% of GDP): inter alia on 
development cooperation, diplomacy, 
defence, functioning costs, and transfers to 
the national railway company 
 Reduction in healthcare expenditure: -0.1% 
of GDP 
 Other social security measures: -0.1% of 
GDP 
2014 
 Decrease in the VAT rate on electricity 
 Increase in excise duties 
 
 Efficiency gains in the public administration 
 Only partial replacement of retiring civil 
servants 
 Capping (real) growth of health-care 
expenditure at 3% 
A positive sign implies that revenue/expenditure increases as a consequence of this measure.  
For 2010–2012: Annual budgetary impacts expressed as a percentage of GDP are estimated by 
the Commission services (Commission, 2013a) 
For 2013: The budgetary impact for 2013 in the table is the impact reported in the 2013 
programme by the Belgian authorities (Commission, 2013b) 
For 2014: As reported in the 2014 (draft) Programme. No budgetary impact available 
(Commission, 2014a) 
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